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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the technical, legal and political feasibility of linking the 
European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) with the Californian cap-
and-trade programme (CAT). The technical feasibility of linking refers to the 
alignment of four key design features in the EU ETS and the CAT: (i) offset 
credits; (ii) price adjustment mechanisms (PAM); (iii) complementary climate 
and energy policies and (iv) monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). 
Unless Europe and California can align their polar positions regarding land use, 
clearance and forestry (LULUCF) offsets and price floors, linking appears 
unlikely. There is also the question of how California’s Allowance Price 
Containment Reserve (APCR) and the EU’s proposed Market Stability Reserve 
(MSR) would function together in a linked scheme. Aligning the complementary 
climate and energy policies and MRV systems is less problematic, as 
harmonisation is not necessary. Regarding legal feasibility, it is unclear whether 
California, as a sub-national state, has the authority to negotiate and enter into 
a linked scheme with the EU. Politically, California may be reluctant to link with 
the EU, as this will lower both its allowance price and fiscal revenue. 
Furthermore, it could decrease the level of domestic investment and 
abatement. Assuaging California’s concerns rests heavily on the extent to 
which the proposed structural reforms to the EU ETS boost the allowance price. 
In the case of linking the EU ETS and the CAT, domestic policy objectives are 
more important than the cost-efficiency gains of linking. As such, establishing a 
partial link may be more feasible. 
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Section I Introduction & Background 
Section I.A Introduction & Literature Review 
Although countries have pledged to form a global climate change agreement in 
Paris in 2015 (Decision, CP19, 2013; Decision, CP17, 2011), the development of 
an international climate change regime has been problematic: not only has 
progress been slow, but there are real concerns over the quality of this new 
agreement (Figueres, 2014; Fujiwara, 2013; Haites, Yamin & Höhne, 2013). This 
has increased the focus on the potential of fragmented, bottom-up responses 
to climate change.  
 
Traditionally, the United Nations’ (UN) approach to climate change has been 
top-down, as exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol (KP) (1997). The KP is an 
agreement based on multilateral membership that sets out legally binding 
commitments, managed under the centralised authority of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (1992) (Leal-Arcas, 2011). However, efforts to 
produce another universal, legally binding treaty have ‘been producing 
diminishing returns for some time’ (Falkner, Stephan & Vogler, 2010, p.253). 
There has also been an increasing tendency for the international climate 
change regime to adopt a mix of top-down and bottom-up approaches 
(Edenhofer, Flachsland, Stavins & Stowe, 2013), rather than attempt to create 
another KP. This is evident in the pledge-and-review approach adopted at the 
Copenhagen and Cancun Conference of the Parties. Although there is still a 
degree of centralised monitoring and oversight by the UN, it is up to each 
individual country to voluntarily submit their national mitigation 
commitments. 
 
Rather than wait for a global unified climate change regime to emerge, perhaps 
there is also a role for bottom-up responses, such as ETSs, in combatting climate 
change (Jaffe, Ranson & Stavins, 2009; Keohane & Victor, 2010). Indeed even if 
an agreement in 2015 emerges, it is likely to be modeled on the system adopted 
in Copenhagen and Cancun (Edenhofer et al., 2013). As such, there is still a 
significant role ETSs can play in addressing climate change, as it can help 
countries achieve their national mitigation targets. 
 
 
 
 6
 
An ETS is a quantity-based market mechanism that sees climate change ‘as 
market failure on the grandest scale the world has ever seen’ (Stern, 2007, 
p.25). It establishes a set of property rights, in this case, tradable permits, as an 
optimal means of controlling pollution. The resultant market transactions 
would ensure ‘an optimum utili[s]ation of rights’ (Coase, 1960, p.27). In 
practice, the scheme caps the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for a 
target population. Within this cap, it distributes emission permits among 
participants and then allows them to trade such permits with each other in 
order to meet their commitments. Unlike classic command and control 
regulations, there is no set emissions reduction strategy. Rather, the trading 
mechanism helps to keep reduction costs down by redistributing permits to 
firms for whom emissions reductions are the hardest or costliest.  
 
Such systems are evident on the local, national and regional level, and linking 
such schemes could help reduce the cost of addressing climate change. There 
has been significant work done outlining the economic and political advantages 
of linking ETSs (Burtraw, Palmer, Munnings, Weber & Woerman, 2013; 
Flachsland, Marschinski & Edenhofer, 2009a; Jaffe et al., 2009). However, the 
benefits of linking are highly contingent on the design of the ETS and the goals 
of its regulators. Indeed, although there is significant literature on the 
theoretical benefits of linking, this is often based on ideal conditions in order to 
achieve an optimum outcome, with less focus on the institutional and political 
constraints (Convery, 2009). Partly, this is because no credible linking 
alternatives for the EU ETS have emerged until recently.  
 
However, contemporary literature has begun to address the practical and 
political aspects of implementing a linked scheme (Duscha & Schleich, 2009; 
Haites & Mullins, 2001; Jaffe et al., 2009; Tuerk et al., 2009a; Zetterberg, 2012). 
This thesis seeks to add to the emerging literature and focuses on the 
governance aspects of a linked ETS. Specifically, this thesis will expand on 
Zetterberg’s paper, which has analysed the alignment challenges of linking the 
EU ETS and the CAT (2012). 
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Section I.B Research Question 
This thesis purports to answer the following research question:  
 
Is it feasible to link the EU ETS and the CAT? 
 
In addressing feasibility, this thesis will look at two components: (i) technical 
feasibility and (ii) political and legal feasibility.  
Section I.B(i) Technical Feasibility 
The first component focuses on whether the design features of both ETSs allow 
them to be linked. This does not mean that all features need to be identical. In 
order to identify the relevant features, this thesis focuses on whether the 
alignment of these features is necessary for: (i) stability and investor 
confidence; (ii) environmental integrity and (iii) minimising negative economic 
and distributional impact (based on criteria used by Mehling, Tuerk & Sterk, 
2011; Sterk & Kruger, 2009; Tuerk et al., 2009a; Zetterberg, 2012). 
 
Figure 1: ETS design features & Relevancy to linking 
Design Features Relevancy to Linking 
MRV & registries 
Banking & borrowing 
Compliance periods 
New entrants and closures 
Enforcement 
Type of cap 
Allocation methods 
 
 
Harmonisation not needed/relatively easy to 
achieve 
Target stringency* Contingent on similar levels of ambition 
PAMs* If unaligned, will decrease efficiency of linked 
scheme 
Eligibility of offsets* Differing views on offset types and limits could 
inhibit linking 
* = critical features 
Source: Mehling et al., 2011; Sterk & Kruger, 2009; Tuerk et al., 2009a; Zetterberg, 
2012 
 
Given the EU ETS and the CAT have similar levels of ambition (Flachsland et al., 
2008) this aspect will not be addressed. Thus, this thesis focuses on the 
coordination of carbon offsets and PAMs in order to facilitate linking between 
the EU ETS and the CAT. However, given the divergent views of Californian and 
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EU policy makers on LULUCF offsets and PAMs, aligning these two elements 
pose significant political challenges. Additionally, two further design features 
will be addressed: complementary climate and energy policies within the EU 
and California, and MRV systems. Coordinating these complementary policies 
may be necessary given the potential impact they can have on the carbon price. 
Finally, aligning MRV systems is important in order to ensure the linked system 
is perceived as credible and trustworthy by regulated entities in both systems.1 
Section I.B(ii) Legal and Political Feasibility 
Even if these four key features are aligned, the legal and political feasibility of 
linking must also be addressed. One point to bear in mind is that the EU ETS 
governs several countries, whereas the CAT is a sub-national scheme of a single 
US state. It is unclear whether California has the legal authority to negotiate 
and link with the EU. Equally, it is unclear how the actual linking negotiations 
would proceed. For instance, would the European Commission (EC) negotiate 
with California as an equal partner, if so, how would member states (MS) react 
to this? From a political perspective, linking may not necessarily benefit both 
parties as it could have a significant impact on their policy goals and revenue. 
The preferences and perceptions of Californian and EU actors - including its MS 
– need to be taken into account, as divergent views and priorities can constitute 
a serious barrier to linking (Wettestad & Jevnaker, 2013). In this regard, the 
potential distributional impact of a linked EU-CAT scheme, particularly for 
California, may outweigh the gains realised by way of political symbolism and 
cost-efficiency. 
Section I.C Research Methodology 
To answer the research question, this thesis will undertake a qualitative 
comparative analysis of the CAT and the EU ETS’ key design features. The legal 
and political feasibility of linking will also be considered. In order to evaluate 
the design features that must be aligned in order for a linked scheme to 
operate, I also undertook a literature review on the advantages and 
disadvantages of linking. The most important criteria are: environmental 
effectiveness, design compatibility, cost-effectiveness and political feasibility. 
These were then used to determine the four design features outlined in the 
                                                 
1 For an analysis of the alignment of other design features for the EU ETS and the CAT, see 
Zetterberg, 2012; more generally see Burtraw et al., 2013; Tuerk et al., 2009. 
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previous paragraph (section I.B). A qualitative comparative analysis of the CAT 
and the EU ETS’ four design features is then undertaken. Moreover, I canvassed 
and analysed a number of primary sources including the legislation, regulation 
and guidelines from both ETSs, as well as the legislation, guidelines and 
government reports surrounding other ETSs (i.e. Australia and Quebec), which 
are linked, or may link, with my case studies to help understand how the 
various design features were negotiated.  
 
Finally, in order to better understand the feasibility of creating a linked EU-
Californian scheme, nine interviews with experts in the field of climate change 
were undertaken. Such experts included representatives from: the EC, the 
California Air Resource Board (CARB), the European Energy Exchange, the 
International Carbon Action Partnership, the International Emissions Trading 
Authority, the Climate Action Reserve, the Mercator Research Institute for 
Global Commons and Climate Change, and the University of California, San 
Diego. Overall, the respondents were relatively enthusiastic about the potential 
linkage of the EU ETS and California; although there is significant concern about 
its political and legal feasibility. 
Section I.D Essay Structure 
This essay is divided into four sections:  
The first section introduces the EU ETS and the CAT, the two ETSs chosen as 
potential linking candidates, and also discusses the literature review on linking. 
The review includes the various types of linking possible, as well as the 
economic, administrative and political advantages and disadvantages of 
engaging in such action.  
 
The second section examines the technical feasibility of aligning the offsets, 
PAMs, complementary climate policies and MRV systems in order to create a 
European-Californian scheme. This section is further divided into four sub-
sections. The first looks at the use of offsets, in particular, the use of LULUCF 
and CDM offsets. These mechanisms let regulated entities finance emissions 
reduction projects to generate credits, which can then be traded on the carbon 
market. The second sub-section looks at the alignment of PAMs and how a 
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quantitative-based adjustment mechanism, like the EU’s proposed MSR (EC, 
2014a), can be aligned with the price-based adjustment mechanism in the CAT. 
Furthermore, California’s auction price floor must also be aligned, as it would 
have a significant impact on the linked European-Californian scheme. The next 
sub-section looks at the role of complementary climate policies in a linked 
scheme. Complementary policies, like the renewable energy targets for the EU 
(EC, 2006), will be discussed and the extent to which they need to be aligned, 
especially if they will affect the carbon price. Finally, the issue of MRV systems 
will also be discussed.  
 
The third section examines the legal and political feasibility of a linked 
European-Californian scheme. With respect to legal feasibility, the different 
linking methods will be addressed, with the finding that a direct link is most 
likely achieved by amending the respective legislations that govern the EU ETS 
and the CAT. However, the ability of California to negotiate and link with the EU 
is unclear. Regarding political feasibility, the preferences of European and 
Californian policy-makers will be considered.  
 
Finally, the fourth section will summarise the key findings of this thesis. 
Ultimately, it will be shown that, although a linked scheme may well be legally 
and technically possible to establish, the political feasibility of such a scheme 
still presents significant obstacles.  
Section I.E Case Studies: EU & California 
The EU ETS (Directive 2003/87/EC) is the centrepiece of the EU’s climate policy. 
It is the first, and largest, ETS, encompassing the 28 EU MS, as well as Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. It covers 45% of GHG emissions across the EU and 
includes energy-intensive sectors like bulk chemical or cement production, the 
commercial aviation industry, as well as power and heat generating facilities 
(EC, 2013a). The EU ETS was launched in 2005. It underwent a pilot phase from 
2005-2007, followed the KP’s commitment period from 2008-2012 and is 
currently in the third phase, from 2013 to 2020, aiming for a 21% reduction of 
GHG emissions from 2005 levels (EC, 2013b). In the first two phases, the EU ETS 
operated under national allocation plans and the free allocation of permits was 
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the main means by which permits were distributed. By the third phase, the EU 
ETS had imposed an EU-wide cap and the share of auctioning has increased to 
40% (ibid).  
 
 
Due to an over-allocation of allowances under the EU ETS and the economic 
crisis, both of which have reduced the demand for such allowances, the EU ETS 
has experienced a strong decline in the carbon price (Berghmans, Sartor & 
Stephan, 2013; Haug, Frerk, Kachi, Serre & Wilkening, 2014; van der Gaast & 
Spijker, 2013). As such, there has been considerable debate about potential 
reforms and the future of the EU ETS (EC, 2014a; Haug et al., 2014; Sartor, 
2012). Although the EC has proposed delaying (‘backloading’) the auction of 
900 million allowances, it is also considering longer-term structural reforms to 
address the supply and demand issue within the EU ETS (Haug et al., 2014). 
Specifically, the EC has proposed a MSR, which would adjust allowance volumes 
when it is outside a specific, pre-determined range (EC, 2014a). Essentially, 
allowances are removed and released in relation to the total number of 
allowances in the market in order to better balance out supply and demand (EC, 
2014a). 
  
In California, the Global Warming Solutions Act outlines its commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to reduce 1990 levels by 80% 
by 2050 (2006).  Rather than mandating concrete programmes and steps, it 
empowers the CARB to set policy, monitor and regulate, in order to achieve the 
legislation’s objective of making low-carbon technology more desirable and 
reducing GHG emissions. Passed in 2010, and coming into effect in 2012, 
California’s CAT covers 85% of California’s GHG emissions and is also linked to 
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). The WCI is a regional ETS initiative, which, 
when fully implemented, will allow Californian regulated firms to trade with 
collaborating States in the United States, Canada and Mexico (CARB, 2011). 
Currently, emissions trading between WCI States, is limited to California and 
Quebec, which signed a linking agreement in 2013 (Agreement between 
California Air Resources Board and the Gouvernement du Québec concerning 
the harmonisation and integration of cap-and-trade programs for reducing 
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greenhouse gas emissions [hereinafter Agreement], 2013). The CAT covers 
electric utilities and large industrial facilities with allowances set at 90% of 
average emissions. These allowances will initially be free but will transition to 
auctioned allowances later in the programme. Furthermore, in 2015 the 
scheme will be extended to transportation, natural gas and other fuels. For a 
comparison of the two ETSs, see figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the EU ETS and CAT 
 EU ETS CAT 
Population 500 million 38 million 
Coverage EU-28 MS + Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and 
Norway. 
 
California 
 
Point of regulation Downstream  Hybrid  
Trading Unit Per metric tonne of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) 
Per metric tonne of CO2 
Gross regional product US$ 16 trillion US$ 1.9 trillion 
GHG CO2, N2O, PFCs  
Possibility to cover all 
GHGs under the KP 
CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, PFCs 
& NF3 
Sectors Electricity, heat & steam 
production, industrial 
sectors (oil, iron & steel, 
cement, glass, pulp & 
paper), CO2 from 
petrochemicals, 
ammonia, aluminum, 
N2O from acid 
production, PFCs from 
aluminum 
Electricity (including 
imports) & industry, 
ground transportation & 
heating fuels as of 2015 
Allocation Electricity: 100% 
auctioning 
Industry: 20% auctioning 
(2030: 70% free 
allocation; 2027: full 
auctioning) 
Emissions-intensive 
trade exposed sectors: 
free allocation up to 
100%  
Mostly free allocation to 
vulnerable industries 
and electricity 
generators 
Phase I: average entity 
receives 90% free 
allowances, this 
percentage decreases as 
CAT progresses 
Energy mix by sector Industry: 28% 
Households: 41% 
Transport: 31% 
Industry: 23% 
Commercial: 18% 
Households: 18% 
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Transport: 40% 
Banking and Borrowing Banking possible 
Borrowing within 
trading period (phasing 
out) 
Banking possible 
No borrowing 
Emission thresholds Any combustion 
installation over 20 MW, 
sector-specific threshold 
for other sources 
Emitters of at least 
25,000 metric tons CO2e 
annually 
Target 21% below 2005 
emissions by 2020 
Reduce GHG emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2020 
and to reduce 1990 
levels by 80% by 2050 
2013 allowance budgets 2039 million allowances 162.8 million allowances 
Penalties €100/excess tonne plus 
surrender missing 
allowances in the next 
year 
3 allowances/tonne not 
covered 
Emissions target (million 
metric tonnes of CO2) 
1643 (2020) 334.2 (2020) 
Price floor - Auction price floor: 
US$10/tonne, rising 5% 
annually (+ inflation) 
starting in 2014 
Linking  Discussions with 
Switzerland and 
Australia 
Linked with Quebec 
(2014) 
2013 offset use limit Considering limits post 
20202 
13 million 
Offset categories 1. Clean 
Development 
Mechanism 
(CDM)3 
2. Some Joint 
Implementation 
(JI) projects 
(exclude LULUCF; 
adipic acid & HFC 
credits) 
1. Federal 
forestry/urban 
forestry 
2. Livestock 
3. Ozone depleting 
substances 
Source: Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2014; EC Climate Action, 2013 
 
                                                 
2 The EU has proposed limits for the use of CDM and JI credits during the 2012-2020 compliance 
period. Regulated entities are entitled to use such credits up until the higher limit of either: (i) 
the amount specified in the phase II national allocation plan; or (ii) 11% of the free allocation 
of EU allowances distributed to them during that period (EC, 2013c).  
3 However, both the use of CDM and JI credits may be banned as of 2020 (EC, 2014b). 
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Despite the emergence of numerous ETSs across the globe, the CAT has been 
chosen as a linking candidate for the EU ETS for three reasons. Firstly, linking 
with California would be in line with the EU’s goal of establishing a 
transatlantic carbon market (EC, 2013b). Linking these schemes could form the 
backbone of a potential US-EU linked ETS. This would also add significant 
momentum to creating a global carbon market. It might be prudent for the EU 
to grasp the opportunity to link its scheme with that of California and not wait 
for a chance to link with a US ETS, as few consider a national ETS scheme before 
2020 to be likely (IETA, 2013; Zetterberg 2012).4 
 
Secondly, the Californian 
and European schemes 
have similar levels of 
ambition (Flachsland et 
al., 2008; see figure 3). 
The EU has proposed a 
25% reduction below 
business-as-usual 
emissions, with 
California proposing a 
slightly more ambitious 
target of 40% (ibid). If 
the available abatement 
options for both 
schemes are also factored in, figure 3 highlights that both the EU ETS and the 
CAT have similar levels of ambition. Indeed target stringency is ‘one of the most 
politically critical issues […] [for] linkage’ (Tuerk, 2009, p.2). Linking with a 
scheme that has a significantly lower target would require that scheme to 
accept a substantial reduction in domestic abatement and its carbon price 
(ibid). This not only undermines the scheme’s own domestic preferences, it also 
results in a loss of revenue (ibid).  
 
                                                 
4 This point was raised in interviews with experts from the US. 
Figure  3:  Domestic  abatement  costs  &  ambition  of  ETS
Source: Flachsland, Edenhofer, Jakob & Steckel, 2008 
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Finally both parties have already met to share information and discuss linking 
their ETSs (Carus, 2011). Furthermore, since the CAT was purposefully designed 
in a manner that would facilitate trading with the EU ETS and other schemes 
(Executive Order S-20-06, 2006), then both parties have the means and intent 
to establish a linked scheme. 
Section I.F Background & Literature Review 
Section I.F(i) Types of Linking 
Most ETSs across the world, from Kazakhstan to Tokyo, have, or have proposed, 
some form of linking (Ranson & Stavins, 2014). As Ranson and Stavins identify, 
these can be grouped into four categories: (i) unilateral and bilateral links 
between ETSs; (ii) unilateral links with a credit system, such as the JI and CDM; 
(iii) implied links through national trading as per the KP, Article 17 and (iv) other 
types of non-traditional links (i.e. linking by degrees (Burtraw et al., 2013)) 
(2014). However, unilateral links will not allow for both parties to trade 
allowances and California is reluctant to link with international credit systems, 
like the CDM. As such, this thesis will propose a direct bilateral link between the 
EU ETS and the CAT in the long-term, with non-traditional linkages forming in 
the short-term, in order to facilitate the bilateral link. Thus, it will focus only on 
the first category and the last category of linking.  
 
By forming a two-way link, both schemes would commit to mutually recognise 
and accept allowances from the other. As a result, the political and economic 
circumstances of both partners would now affect the other. Furthermore, any 
additional links one scheme may have would also be extended to the other, 
such as the use of CDM offsets in the EU. Given this automatic propagation, it is 
important to ensure, that when negotiating the two-way link, key design 
features are aligned, or failing that, certain policy tools are put in place to avoid 
later compromising the goals of both schemes (Burtraw et al., 2013).  
 
In the short-term, however, it is proposed that the EU and California begin 
‘linking by degrees’ (Burtraw et al., 2013, p.1). Cooperating on certain aspects, 
such as aligning cap-setting methodologies or implementing narrow linkages, 
for instance, based on certain sectors or offsets. This can help pave the way for 
a more formal and direct link in the future. These initial links let regulators 
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become familiar with the institutions of the other system and are a practical 
means of transitioning to a directly linked system (Burtraw et al., 2013). This 
can also help pinpoint further areas that require cooperation or alignment.  
Section I.F(ii) Advantages of Linking 
Establishing a directly linked two-way system offers several economic, 
administrative and political advantages. In terms of economic advantages, 
linking offers three distinct advantages: it increases cost efficiency, sends a 
clearer carbon price signal and lowers competitive distortions (Ahlberg et al., 
2013; Edenhofer, Flachsland & Marschinski, 2007; Haites & Mullins, 2001). The 
increase in cost efficiency is illustrated by figure 4. When both schemes link, 
this results in more abatement opportunities for both sides, leading to sales of 
allowances in the lower priced system (system 2) to entities under the higher 
priced system (system 1), until the prices in both schemes have equalised (Jaffe 
et al., 2009; Zetterberg 2012).  
 
This is because system 2 will pursue additional emissions reductions and sell 
their surplus to system 1 entities, which will purchase the cheaper allowances 
from system 2 until the price in both systems are the same (Zetterberg, 2012). 
The cost savings for system 1 is outlined by the blue triangle, which is the 
reduction of abatement costs less the cost of the additional system 2 
allowances. Conversely, the yellow triangle in system 2 highlights the net 
revenue accrued, which consists of the value of sold allowances minus the 
additional costs of abatement. From a theoretical perspective, the scheme is 
Figure  4:  Effects  of   l inking  two  ETSs
 
Source: Zetterberg, 2012 
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more cost efficient as emissions are reduced at the lowest cost (Edenhofer et al., 
2007).  
 
Furthermore, the economic gains from linking can be significant. For instance, 
regulated EU entities have saved up to $1.2 billion from 2008-2011 through the 
one-way link between the EU ETS and the CDM, which allows firms to reduce 
emissions by funding international projects (Ranson & Stavins, 2014).   
 
A second economic advantage of linking is a clearer carbon price signal. A bigger 
market not only increases the strength of the price signal but would also 
provide some certainty to investors in carbon-intensive industries. This is 
because the mutual pressure among linking partners, and the potential 
sanctioning mechanism (i.e. trade restrictions), helps the linked scheme to 
establish a credible price signal (Flachsland et al., 2009a; Zetterberg, 2012). 
Such pressure and the potential loss of reputation can also ensure partners do 
not relax their cap or the ambitiousness of their scheme. More generally, a 
unified carbon price would help the domestic public and businesses accept 
climate policy, as other jurisdictions are also subject to a carbon price 
(Zetterberg, 2012). Finally, a linked carbon scheme could also reduce 
competitiveness concerns and fears about carbon leakage, as regulated entities 
in the same sector would be subject to the same carbon price across both 
schemes.  
 
Secondly, it would also reduce the administrative costs of emissions trading. 
This would also benefit regulated entities, as a linked scheme would create 
more consistent procedures and regulations, making it easier to conduct 
business across the linked jurisdictions.  
 
Thirdly, from a political perspective, a linked scheme signals a long-term 
commitment to climate change and multilateralism (Zetterberg, 2012). Indeed 
the EU has been particularly vocal on this point, outlining its vision for 
establishing an OECD-wide carbon market by 2015, extending this to major 
emerging powers by 2020 (EC, 2009). For the EU, linking would also be a means 
of gaining global cooperation on climate change, as a transatlantic carbon 
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market would be concrete proof of the EU’s commitment to climate change. 
Although California does not participate in international climate negotiations, 
linking could also have positive political benefits. Expanding their policies on 
climate change would be in line with its regional role as an environmental 
leader (Carlson, 2013). A link would also showcase California’s climate efforts, 
despite the laggard progress on the federal level. Indeed, a transatlantic link 
would not only increase California’s policy influence over the federal level, it 
could stimulate further federal action as well. 
Section I.F(iii) Disadvantages of Linking 
Of course, there are economic and political risks associated with linking ETSs. 
From an economic perspective, even though linking creates a larger market to 
spread the impact of price shocks, it also increases the contagiousness of 
political and economic conditions from one scheme to the other, potentially 
making the linked scheme more volatile (Zetterberg, 2012). Given the price 
volatility of the EU ETS and the price crash during the financial crisis 
(Berghmans et al., 2013), California may be reluctant to link with the EU, 
especially as the EU ETS does not have the same price controls as the CAT. As 
Ranson and Stavins argue, linkage may help stabilise the daily fluctuation in the 
allowance price, however it also results in an increased vulnerability to 
systematic risk (2014). The case of the New Zealand ETS is an illustrative 
example. As both authors argue, it was the New Zealand ETS’ unrestricted use 
of CDM credits that contributed to the crash of its emission price (2014).5 The 
initial collapse of the EU ETS allowance prices affected CDM prices, which, in 
turn, led to a decline in the New Zealand ETS price (ibid). Furthermore, although 
a linked ETS levels the playing field between the two parties, it does nothing 
against other countries, which may not have a carbon price (Flachsland et al., 
2009a). 
 
Linking partners must also consider the economic impact on their own system, 
as the overall cost-efficiency benefits from linking ETSs may, on a micro-level, 
be outweighed by negative distortionary effects (Flachsland et al., 2009a). For 
example, as linking lowers the carbon price in one system, this could have a 
                                                 
5 Although the failure of key countries to ratify the KP, such as the United States, likely also 
contributed to the CDM’s price decrease, as it lowered the demand for such credits. 
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negative impact on their expected fiscal revenue. This was predicted to be the 
case for Australia, with estimates that the planned link between the Australian 
and the EU ETS would result in an annual revenue loss of $AU3-5 billion (Priest 
& Drummond, 2012). As such, linking raises broader concerns about the 
distribution of efficiency gains between linked partners. Although linking may 
lead to cost-efficiency gains on the macro level, on the micro level, it creates 
winners and losers among linking partners, firms and consumers. Generally, the 
literature argues that the distributional impact depends on whether an entity is 
the net seller or buyer (Flachsland et al., 2009a; Jaffe et al., 2009; Zetterberg, 
2012). Sellers under an ETS with an initially lower allowance price will benefit 
from linking, as they can sell their allowances for a higher price. Looking at the 
situation from the other side, the buyers in the lower priced ETS will be worse 
off after linking, as the allowances will become more expensive.  
 
A linked scheme also has its political disadvantages, for instance, the potential 
for unilateral regulatory intervention is restricted. This is not only because 
parties may have to jointly operate certain aspects of the linked scheme, for 
example, market monitoring, but also because of the indirect impact of one 
scheme on the other. For instance, a price floor in one system will automatically 
have an impact on the other system. This is a major concern for the CAT and the 
EU ETS, as only the CAT has a price floor. As such, linking may also pose another 
political risk for participants. That is, the policy goals of each separate system 
could become compromised when they link together (Flachsland et al., 2009a). 
This might be a particular concern for linking partners who have instituted an 
ETS as an incentive for domestic abatement, for if linking substantially diverts 
domestic abatement overseas, then this policy goal will be compromised.  
 
A linking scheme might not only be politically damaging on a national level, but 
internationally as well. For instance, UN negotiations on climate change may be 
hampered by the presence of linked ETSs, which present an alternative avenue 
and means of tackling climate change (Flachsland et al., 2009a). However, as 
the EU has demonstrated, a linked ETS does not preclude a UN global 
agreement, rather it can also be employed as a tool for achieving one’s 
international commitments. Finally, the complexity of the governance structure 
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required to manage a linked scheme – from managing responses to policy or 
economic shocks and monitoring standards – may outweigh the efficiency 
gains of equalising one’s carbon price; particularly for the party that benefits 
the least from linking. 
The trade-off is similar to debates about adopting a common currency, ‘[…] 
where increased economic efficiency (reduced transaction costs and exchange 
rate uncertainty, higher price stability) and the wider political benefits are 
weighed against the costs of ceding discretionary regulatory control over the 
domestic economy’ (Flachsland et al., 2009a, p.12), as well as the uneven 
distributional impacts of linking. But, even if the advantages are perceived to 
outweigh the disadvantages, the benefits of linking are highly contingent on 
the design of the system. Thus, it is important that the linked scheme is 
carefully designed in order to minimise such risks – this includes the challenge 
of harmonising the key features of each system. Furthermore both systems 
would have to adapt existing legislation that governs their respective ETSs. In 
the case of the EU ETS and the CAT, a particular challenge will be reconciling the 
use of offsets, aligning the various PAMs, coordinating complementary climate 
policies that may affect the carbon price and MRV systems. 
Section II Technical Feasibility 
Section II.A Offsets: Stringency & Limits 
The harmonisation of offsets is a key step towards linking (Flachsland et al., 
2009a; Sterk, Mehling & Tuerk, 2009). If offsets are not harmonised, there is a 
risk this frees up domestic allowances (Zetterberg, 2012). For instance, if the EU 
were to purchase offset credits in a sector California does not recognise, like 
biomass, then the EU could use these credits for domestic compliance purposes, 
freeing up allowances they would have otherwise bought on the linked market. 
 
There are three components that need to be considered when aligning offsets: 
stringency, limits and project eligibility (Tuerk et al., 2009b). Firstly, offsets must 
be of a high quality, that is, additionality and high MRV standards must be 
guaranteed on both sides. Although the exact definition of additionality is still a 
contested concept (Streck, 2010), at its most basic, entities must show that the 
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project or the actual reduction in emissions would not have occurred but for 
their financing. In terms of MRV, harmonisation is not necessary, however, 
comparable standards are. Otherwise, generous crediting rules in one ETS can 
distort and weaken the cap in the other system. Equally, regulators must ensure 
projects are not counted at both the implementation and emissions trading 
level. That is, if an offset project also results in emission reductions for a 
covered installation, credits cannot be issued for both. Resolving this issue, 
however, should not be too difficult as both the EU and California have high 
MRV standards (discussed further in section II.D).  
 
Secondly, limits. California has capped the use of offsets at 8% of compliance 
obligations. In comparison, the EU lets entities use emission credits from 2012-
2020 up until the higher of two limits: (i) the international credit limits 
specified in the national allocation plans or (ii) 11% of the free allocation of EU 
allowances granted to them in that period (EC, 2013a). However, given the EU is 
phasing out CDM and JI credits (Wellman, 2013), this should not be a significant 
issue for linking. Finally, the major issue here is the project eligibility of CDM 
and LULUCF offsets. 
 
Section II.A(i) CDM Offsets  
Particularly from a Californian perspective, CDM offsets may be an important 
issue for negotiation. The CDM offers developed countries some flexibility in 
meeting their emissions targets by purchasing credits generated through 
emission reduction projects in developing countries (UN Framework 
Convention for Climate Change, 2014). However, whilst the EU is unilaterally 
linked to the CDM, California is not, over real concerns about its environmental 
effectiveness (Tänzer, Kachi & Sterk, 2013). These concerns are echoed by the 
WCI, which states more generally that any offsets outside of North America 
would have to ensure the environmental integrity of such credits in a bilateral 
agreement (Bumpus, 2012). Promisingly, the concerns of Californian regulators 
may be eased by the EU’s potential ban on international offsets for 2020-2030 
(EC, 2014b). Thus, the use of CDM offsets should no longer be an issue (EC, 
2014b). However, any development in this regard will also be closely linked to 
 
 
 22
developments in the UN international climate change negotiations, (Zetterberg, 
2012).   
 
Finally, California would also need to consider its position on the EU’s interest in 
a new market mechanism for developing countries, which would generate 
credits across whole economic sectors (EC, 2014d). Given California’s reluctance 
to embrace international offset credits, instead preferring a domestic focus for 
its CAT, this suggests that the EU’s adoption of such a mechanism – if it were to 
be established – could pose an additional hurdle to linking. 
Section II.A(ii) LULUCF Offsets 
LULUCF offsets may also be an important issue for negotiators, as California 
permits the use of domestic land-use offsets as well as international REDD 
credits, the latter of which is an international mechanism focused on reducing 
deforestation and forest degradation (CARB, 2011). However, such projects are 
not currently recognised within the EU ETS (Mehling et al., 2011), since there is 
concern that the reductions are not permanent (EC, 2008). That is, once 
emissions are removed from the atmosphere, they might still be released back 
into the atmosphere through fires or by other means, such as agricultural 
activities (Tuerk et al., 2009b). If California and the EU were to establish a linked 
scheme, and such credits were sold to the EU, then the EU could be in an 
awkward position. Not only must the EU assume responsibility for the 
permanence of these emission reductions (Tuerk et al., 2009b), but it would also 
need to ensure the environmental integrity of such offsets by employing MRV 
systems of a quality not yet present within the EU ETS (EC, 2008). Ultimately, 
from a European perspective, LULUCF offsets are seen as an unnecessary 
complication to the EU ETS and deforestation is an issue the EU prefers to 
address through other means. For instance, by using auction revenues to invest 
in LULUCF projects (EC, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, California has imposed additional requirements for forestry and 
urban forestry offsets, which ensure permanency. The California Forest 
Protocols require a perpetual conservation easement, which gives the 
government the right to protect the project area from conversion to non-forest 
use (Tuerk et al., 2009b), essentially guaranteeing the permanence of the 
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emissions reductions. Such rights are legally binding and are attached to the 
land title deeds (for more regulations concerning LULUCF offsets see Streck, 
O’Sullivan, Janson-Smith & Tarasofsky, 2010). Secondly, forestry projects must 
be risk-assessed and hold back a certain portion of their credits in a buffer pool 
(‘Forest Buffer Account’) to draw from in the event of an unexpected natural 
loss, such as wildfire (Sopher & Mansell, 2013a). These stringent, additional 
environmental requirements could help persuade the EU to reconsider its 
position on LULUCF offsets. 
 
Although it is not necessary to have completely identical carbon offset policies 
(Tänzler et al., 2013), if no solution can be reached, one compromise could be 
for the EU to apply an import quota on Californian LULUCF offsets. As long as 
the accounting system provided a means of identifying different allowance 
types, it would then be possible for both markets to maintain their offset 
preferences. One suggestion by Burtraw et al. is the use of unique serial 
numbers for compliance instruments (2013). However, an import quota would 
also reduce the effectiveness and increase the complexity of the linked scheme 
(Mehling et al., 2011). At the same time, the marginal potential benefit from 
California’s LULUCF offsets would also decline (EC, 2008). Even if the EU were to 
impose import quotas, it would still be indirectly allowing the use of such 
offsets in its system. Californian entities could simply use LULUCF credits for 
domestic compliance, thus freeing up Californian allowances that could then be 
sold to EU entities (Sterk et al., 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, there are indications that the EU may be willing to allow the 
indirect use of such offsets. For instance, the EU was prepared to enter into 
linking negotiations with Australia, despite the fact that Australia’s ETS used 
offsets generate through domestic agriculture and land-use management 
projects under the Australian Carbon Farming Initiative. However, it must be 
noted that during those discussions Australia had already made significant 
concessions in relation to its other design features, in particular, the 
abolishment of its AU$15 price floor (de Wit & Gould, 2012). Furthermore, as 
Hawkins and Jegou speculate, if negotiations were to continue, Australia’s 
LULUCF offsets ‘would likely be raised as an issue in future negotiation rounds’ 
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(2014, p.37). Although Switzerland is also in linking negotiations with the EU, it 
changed its international offset credit rules to exclude LULUCF credits (Hawkins 
& Jegou, 2014). As such, it is likely the EU’s acceptance of LULUCF offsets in 
California will also hinge on the agreements reached over other design 
features. 
Section II.B PAMs 
PAMs are difficult to align ‘because they reflect the politically accepted 
objectives and priorities of the domestic program[me] […] and also reflect 
characteristics of the regulatory setting’ (Burtraw et al., 2013, p.30). For an EU-
Californian linked scheme, not only must parties align California’s APCR with 
the EU’s proposed MSR, the issue of California’s auction price floor must also be 
addressed. 
Section II.B(i) Market Strategic Reserves  
California employs an APCR in order to combat market volatility and drastic 
inflation. The APCR receives a percentage of allowances from the annual cap, 
starting from 1% in the first compliance period and increasing to 4% and 7% in 
the following two periods (CARB, 2011). When the market price reaches a 
certain price trigger, the Reserve will release allowances in three price tiers; 
starting in 2013, the tiers will be set at US$40, US$45 and US$50 (Ahlberg et al., 
2013).  
 
Currently, the EU has no reserve mechanism, however, in an attempt to address 
the oversupply of over 2 billion allowances in the EU ETS, the EC has proposed 
to establish a MSR, to begin operation in 2021 (2014a). The EC proposal outlines 
a rule-based, quantitative adjustment mechanism that would release or 
remove a number of allowances when certain conditions are met. If the EC’s 
legislative proposal is adopted, the EU ETS would have a yearly adjustment cap, 
depending on the size of the allowances in circulation. If there are over 833 
million surplus allowances in the previous year, the EC will place 12% of 
allowances into the MSR. If the total number of allowances in circulation drops 
below 400 million, then allowances will gradually be released in installments of 
1 million allowances (EC, 2014a; Hope, 2014). Alternatively, if the carbon price 
is more than three times the average price in the last two years, then 
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allowances will also be released (EC, 2014a). In order to avoid sudden price 
fluctuations, the Commission would announce such adjustments months in 
advance (Hope, 2014). This could go a long way to addressing the oversupply of 
allowances in the EU ETS. This, in conjunction with the more ambitious linear 
reduction factor for the EU ETS cap, proposed to increase from 1.74% to 2.2% at 
the start of phase four, is anticipated to help stabilise allowance prices (EC, 
2014a).  
 
Nevertheless, with regards to linking, although the MSR proposal may boost the 
price of EU allowances, hence bringing it closer to the Californian price, linking 
negotiations must also consider how the MSR would interact with California’s 
APCR. An indicator of how California might deal with this issue comes from its 
former linking negotiations with Quebec. In that case, both Quebec and 
California also had market reserve mechanisms. As a solution, the sale of 
reserve allowances was to be limited only to entities covered by the jurisdiction 
conducting the sales (CARB, 2012). Complete harmonisation was not deemed 
necessary by both parties, although it should be noted that both reserves 
already had the benefit of the same structure, escalation rates and starting 
prices (ibid). For an EU-Californian linked scheme to operate, California could 
once again agree to confine the market reserve sales to Californian-registered 
entities. This would minimise the amount of additional allowances sold to the 
EU ETS and make it easier for both parties to control their respective ETSs 
(Schüle & Sterk, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, further policy modifications would likely be required in order to 
minimise the negative impacts of having multiple market reserves operating at 
different trigger points. Although California’s APCR functions on price and the 
EU’s proposed MSR is a quantity-based mechanism, as both aim to achieve price 
stability, some level of coordination is surely possible.6 For instance, forming a 
body with both EU and California representatives could help establish common 
principles and criteria as to when their respective Reserves would be triggered. 
However, further research is necessary to determine how this would look like in 
practice. If the EU is genuinely interested in pursuing links with California, this 
                                                 
6 This was mentioned during several interviews. 
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could be an opportunity to consider how they could align both market reserves 
and adjust the MSR proposal accordingly.  
Section II.B(ii) Price Floor 
California has a price auction floor set at US$10 (rising 5% annually, plus 
inflation). Conversely, the EU ETS does not. This means that regulated 
Californian entities must pay at least the minimum price at auction. There is no 
price floor for the secondary market, although the price should converge to the 
auction price floor. In practice, this essentially functions as a de facto price floor, 
as the scheme is quickly transitioning to full auctions (rather than free 
allowances) (CARB, 2011). However, the EU ETS has no such scheme. This is 
problematic, since in a linked scheme, a price floor will be automatically 
exported to the other system, consequently affecting the other system’s carbon 
price and its allowance supply (Burtraw et al., 2013).  If the EU and California 
were to link with California’s auction price floor intact, it is expected that 
Californian firms would purchase the cheaper allowances available in the EU 
scheme, until the carbon price equalises. This would have consequences for the 
Californian State budget, as the expected auction revenue would be exported 
to the EU. Moreover, the EU ETS would be adversely affected, as it would lose 
some control over its allowance price. 
 
The indirect impact that a unilateral price floor has on linking might be resolved 
in one of three ways; either the EU adopts an auction price floor, California 
removes its or adopts an exchange rate. It must be noted that the EU has 
already dealt with this once before, during linking negotiations with Australia, 
with the latter party repealing its price floor (de Wit, 2012).  
 
From a theoretical perspective, implementing a price floor in the EU ETS could 
help counter price volatility and risk in the carbon market (Grubb & Neuhoff, 
2006; Wood & Jotzo, 2011). Indeed these issues have been of major concern to 
the EU. However, from the EC’s perspective, price-based mechanisms, such as a 
price floor, interfere with the very nature of the carbon market, which is a 
quantity-based market instrument (EC, 2012). Furthermore, a price floor carries 
the risk of having the carbon price decided by political and administrative 
decisions rather than the market (ibid). These misgivings are reflected in the 
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Commission’s official assessment of reform proposals for the EU ETS, which 
focuses heavily on the risks of a price floor, rather than the advantages it offers 
(EC, 2012).  
 
Moreover, there is probably some reluctance on the EC’s part to propose a 
mechanism that resembles a European carbon tax, which could raise 
subsidiarity objections from the MS (Tindale, 2012). However, unlike a tax, a 
price floor merely determines the minimum allowance price; it does not set the 
price per se. As such, one cannot assume all MS will raise subsidiarity concerns. 
France, for instance, has voiced its support for a price floor and one could argue 
that the UK would also support such an instrument, given its introduction of a 
domestic carbon price floor (Ares, 2013). Equally, the increased revenue a 
minimum price floor would imply may draw support from MS in need of 
additional sources of revenue (Tindale, 2012).  
 
However, there are also MS opposed to EU ETS reform. In particular, the Polish 
government has been quite vocal in its opposition to raising the EU ETS 
allowance price (Tindale, 2012). Of course Poland alone could not prevent 
changes to the EU ETS, however, as Tindale points out, other MS may simply be 
keeping quiet, knowing that the Polish government will speak out, and if it 
comes to a vote, they will side with Warsaw (2012). In any event, despite 
potential support for a price floor among some MS, the EC’s proposal in favour 
of a MSR (as discussed in section II.B(i)) suggests the likelihood of the EU 
proposing, let alone adopting, a price floor is very low at the moment (EC, 
2014a). 
 
The second option, that California repeals its auction price floor, also seems 
relatively unlikely, particularly because California explicitly adopted a price floor 
as a learning response from the EU ETS’s performance (Nichols, 2013). 
Furthermore, given California uses its auction revenue to fund additional 
climate programmes and compensate its citizens who are more vulnerable to 
climate change, it is unlikely to want to undermine the credibility of these 
programmes by dismantling its price floor. 
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Finally, California could impose an exchange rate. This would maintain its 
auction price floor, control the flow of allowances, and safeguard some level of 
fiscal revenue. California could stipulate that, in the event the price floor was 
triggered, an exchange rate would come into place. For instance, Californian 
firms could submit either one Californian allowance or two European 
allowances for one tonne of emissions. However, the environmental integrity of 
a linked scheme with an exchange rate cannot be guaranteed, as it is unclear 
whether emissions would be higher or lower in such a situation compared to a 
non-linked market (Burtraw et al., 2013). If environmental integrity cannot be 
guaranteed, parties may be reluctant to link. Furthermore, in practice, differing 
notions of acceptable carbon prices remain a significant barrier to linking 
(Ranson & Stavins, 2014).  
Section II.C Complementary Climate & Energy Policies 
Complementary climate policies are designed to supplement an ETS. For 
instance, the EU’s CO2 standards for new cars could help reduce emissions from 
the transport sector, which is not covered by its ETS (Reuters in The Guardian, 
2014). Although the merits of these policies go beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is important to consider the extent to which they interact with the trading 
scheme. Such policies could interfere with the offset programme and, more 
importantly, reduce the demand for allowances, which also decreases the price.  
 
California would be particularly concerned with the issue of offsets, since it has 
experienced this problem during linking negotiations with Quebec, as Quebec’s 
landfill emission reductions offset projects were similar to California’s GHG 
emissions regulation for landfills (Regulation to Reduce Methane Emissions 
from Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 2010). California is opposed to the offset 
programmes of its linking partners that cover sectors already under domestic 
regulation in California, as they would receive financial incentives for 
mitigation mandated by direct regulation in California (CARB, 2012). During 
their negotiations, Quebec overcame this obstacle by opting to implement a 
threshold, which excluded landfills of a similar size to those directly regulated 
in California. With respect to EU-Californian linking, given that EU offset credits 
are only for international projects, this issue is unlikely to be of significant 
concern. 
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However, the impact of complementary policies on the demand for allowances 
is also an important issue. This is because in an ETS, any external factors that 
affect emissions would necessarily have an impact on allowance demand, thus 
also affecting the allowance price (Weigt, Ellerman & Delarue, 2013). Consider, 
for example, the EU renewable energy quotas for the electricity sector. Stavins 
contends that such quotas can have a perverse interaction with the ETS that is 
neither good for the environment nor the economy (2014). For instance, it 
would result in emission reductions that would cause electricity generators to 
have additional allowances they do not need. These extra allowances would 
then be sold on to other sectors, which in turn would generate more emissions 
than otherwise there would have been. The overall effect would be a 
neutralization of the emissions reduction created by the electricity sector. This 
complementary policy could also serve to increase aggregate abatement costs, 
since reductions no longer take place where they are most cost efficient (ibid). 
Equally, if renewable energy is not cost-effective, it will increase the marginal 
abatement cost of the electricity sector by mandating the use of a more 
expensive fuel source (Fankhauser, Hepburn & Park, 2010). Moreover, within 
the electricity sector itself, the demand for carbon allowances would be 
reduced, which would drive down the allowance price (Van den Bergh, Delarue 
& D’haeseleer, 2013). 
 
This shows that complimentary energy and climate policies can have 
unforeseen consequences for an ETS (see figure 5), particularly in terms of 
market volatility. This is only further complicated when it is linked to another 
ETS with differing goals and policies.7 
  
                                                 
7 For an overview of EU and Californian climate and energy policies that could impact the 
carbon price, see Annex B. 
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Figure 5: Interdependencies between European renewable energy policy, 
electricity market and EU ETS  
 
 
Source: Van den Bergh et al., 2013 
 
The impact of overlapping policies from multiple ETSs was considered during 
the linking negotiations between California and Quebec, with Quebec 
ultimately adopting California’s low emission vehicle and electric vehicle 
standards. However, identical policies are not necessarily required. In fact the 
EU ETS itself highlights that a linked ETS can function despite the various 
energy and climate policies of its MS,8  although policies like the EU 2020 
Climate and Energy Package do attempt to provide some measure of 
coordination. In the case of the EU and California, regulators on both sides will 
need to identify and consider very carefully the impact that certain 
complimentary policies could have on the carbon price. However, the fact the 
EU cannot give California a level of certainty regarding its exposure to certain 
climate and energy policies may make California reluctant to link, as this would 
expose it to policy shocks from all 28 MS (as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway). Moreover, as the German Energiewende suggests, such policy shocks 
could not only happen without any deference to the EU, but also be quite 
sudden and radical (Strunz, 2013).  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 This was mentioned during one of the interviews. 
Legend        
         CO2 
interdependencies 
          
         price 
interdependencies  
 
 
 31
Section II.D MRV 
When linking ETSs, the MRV of emissions is vital in order to sustain a certain 
level of mutual trust and credibility in the system (Schüle & Sterk, 2008). In 
order to achieve this, the MRV systems of the two parties must be aligned and 
double accounting must be avoided. Furthermore, the registry of allowances 
may need to be jointly governed and enforcement should also be of a 
comparable standard. 
 
Firstly, both parties need to be aware that they are aligning systems from two 
very different origins and that these domestic MRV systems may be operating 
with different rules and guidelines. In EU-Australia linking discussions, the 
alignment of the two MRV systems was not a significant factor, since both 
states were KP signatories. Both states used the treaty’s accounting system, 
accredited third-party verification, and flexibility mechanisms, like the CDM. 
However, California is not a signatory to the KP, and does not use the same 
system; instead, it abides by a different set of rules based on stringent 
guidelines established by the United States Environment Protection Agency 
(Hsia-Kiung, Reyna & O’Connor, 2014). For instance, covered entities must have 
their data independently verified by an accredited, CARB-trained verifier in line 
with International Organisation for Standardisations standards (Haug et al., 
2014), and they are also subject to CARB audits (Nichols, 2013). However, even 
though the California and EU MRV systems have different origins, they are of a 
comparable standard. That prerequisite, along with aligned MRV 
methodologies and allowance tracking, should be sufficient to ensure linkage 
(Ahlberg et al., 2013). 
 
When aligning the two MRV systems, regulators must also be aware of the risk 
of double accounting. That is, where the operator gains allowances on both 
trading schemes for the same reduction in emissions, and, conversely, obtains 
allowances on both schemes if emissions increase. At present, this is not a main 
concern, since the EU ETS and CAT are downstream systems, where emissions 
are regulated at the actual point of emissions. However, it could become an 
issue once the CAT moves into its next phase and becomes a hybrid system, 
including upstream emitters, such as the producers and importers of fossil 
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fuels. With a hybrid scheme in place, there is a risk, for example, that if 
California were to export energy to EU emitters, these emissions could be 
counted twice. However, if negotiators instigate additional MRV requirements, 
which pay specific attention to the origin of fuel or energy products, this should 
help minimise the risk of double accounting.  
 
Secondly, although most aspects of a linked ETS can be arranged through 
diplomatic or other bilateral channels, the registry of allowances should be 
jointly managed. For instance, California and Quebec use WCI, Inc., which is a 
non-profit independent corporation that assists with the technical and 
administrative aspects of their linked scheme. One benefit of a joint registry is 
that it can help combat issues like fraud and market manipulation. Indeed, the 
EU ETS experienced several incidents of fraudulent activity and the 
establishment of a single union registry has helped solve these problems 
(European Voice, 2013). It would also allow for more efficient market oversight, 
which could further guard against market manipulation (Burtaw et al., 2013). 
Moreover, as Burtraw et al. mention, ‘the appearance of shared governance 
may [also] convey legal consistency, which can play a key role in establishing 
confidence’ about the credibility and durability of the linked scheme (2013, p. 
26).  
 
However, two issues arise in establishing a joint European-Californian registry: 
public access and legality. The first issue can be resolved relatively easily by 
ensuring that both schemes provide for the same level of public access, in order 
to reassure entities with any concerns regarding strategic business information 
(Burtraw et al., 2013). However, the legality of a joint EU-California registry may 
be problematic and would be contingent on the willingness of the US 
administration to allow California to set up and partake in such an entity.  
 
Finally, both schemes need to be credibly enforced with relatively stringent 
penalties in order to ensure mutual trust. This is a key concern for California, 
since State law stipulates that the Governor must be satisfied with the ability of 
both the EU and California to credibly enforce their ETS within a linked scheme 
(California Government Code, s 12894(f)). EU regulated firms must pay 
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€100/excess tonne of emissions, plus surrender the missing allowances in the 
next year. Conversely, California requires firms to surrender three allowances 
for every excess tonne. Although the EU and California use different types of 
penalties, they are both of a similar standard; therefore, alignment should not 
be problematic. 
 
Figure 6: Design elements for alignment of EU ETS and CAT 
Design Elements Difficulty 
to Align 
Political 
Importanc
e 
Importance for 
Functioning 
Market 
1. Offsets 
a. Stringency 
b. Limits 
c. CDM 
d. LULUCF 
 
Medium 
Medium 
Easy* 
Hard 
 
No 
Maybe 
No 
Yes 
 
No 
No 
No 
No 
2. PAMs 
a. Market 
Reserve 
b. Auction Price 
Floor 
 
Hard 
Hard 
 
Maybe 
Yes 
 
No 
Maybe 
3. Complementary 
Policies 
Hard Yes Maybe 
4. MRV 
a. Methodology 
b. Joint Registry 
c. Enforcement 
 
Easy 
Medium 
Easy 
 
No 
Yes 
Maybe 
 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
* = if EU’s international offsets ban comes into effect. 
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Section III Legal & Political Feasibility  
Section III.A Legal feasibility 
The EU ETS can be linked to any mandatory ETS ‘whose design elements would 
not undermine [its] environmental integrity’ (Flachsland et al., 2008, p.16). This 
also includes schemes instituted at the sub-national level. However, linking 
with California raises legal and procedural questions for both parties (Tuerk et 
al., 2009a). There are three means of creating a direct link: (i) a formal and 
binding international treaty; (ii) mutual amendment of both ETS legislations, 
complemented by an agreement, such as a memorandum of understanding or 
(iii) establishing a system to convert ETS units via private law (Sterk et al., 2009). 
This thesis considers the potential legal and procedural questions that arise 
from pursuing the first two options, as the latter only results in highly limited 
trading between the contracting individuals (Mehling, 2007). 
Section III.A(i) International Treaty 
A binding international treaty is an agreement between two or more countries 
or international organisations that sets out legally binding rights and 
obligations under international law (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
1969). Concluding an international treaty would provide a strong level of legal 
certainty, as it is a formal agreement that has been negotiated and ratified by 
both parties. It also allows parties to respond to non-compliance or a breach of 
treaty terms through internationally sanctioned compliance mechanisms 
(Mehling, 2007). 
 
For the EU, this process is relatively straightforward. Although the EU is a supra-
national entity, Article 300 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
gives the Commission the authority to negotiate international agreements if 
authorised to do so by the Council. Ratification is then subject to Council 
approval via a qualified majority vote. However, one potential hurdle could be 
the role of the European Parliament in this process (Mehling, 2007). It is 
uncertain whether the Parliament must merely be consulted or must also 
approve the linking agreement. A linking agreement could be read as an 
‘agreement establishing a specific institutional framework by organising 
cooperation procedures’; if so, Parliament’s approval will be necessary (Treaty 
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on the Functioning of the EU, Art 218(6)(a)(iii)).  In this instance, obtaining 
Parliament’s approval may be problematic, given their less-than-enthusiastic 
reception of market-based instruments (Mehling, 2007). 
 
Concluding an international treaty may be problematic for California (Ranson & 
Stavins, 2014),9 as American States are not formal subjects of international law 
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969). The United States 
Constitution forbids States from entering into any ‘treaty, alliance, or 
confederation’ regardless of the ‘title, designation, or form’ (Art I, s 10), if said 
agreement gives the State elements of international sovereignty (Tuerk et al., 
2009a; Virginia v Tennesee, 1893). The Constitution also gives Congress the 
power to ‘regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations’ (Art I, s 8, clause 3). As a 
carbon market can be construed as a form of commerce, this could pose 
another obstacle to linking. However, as the US has no federal ETS, this clause is 
unlikely to hamper linking (Tuerk et al., 2009a).  
 
However, as the US Constitution only prevents States from entering ‘into any 
Agreement or Compact […] with a foreign power’ ‘without the Consent of 
Congress’ (Art I, s 10), California could try and seek Congressional consent 
before undergoing negotiations with the EU. More generally, there may be 
more leeway for agreements to control pollution (Tuerk et al., 2009a). 
Obtaining such consent however, would likely be contingent on the attitude of 
Congress towards climate change and international affairs. Approval would be 
more easily granted under an environmentally conscious administration that 
embraces a multilateral approach to international relations.  
 
Absent Congressional consent, California could argue that they still have the 
authority to conclude a linking agreement with other states as agreements over 
local trans-border issues, such as pollution control, do not require Congressional 
consent (Mehling, 2007). However, this argument has not been tested and it is 
therefore unclear whether California would have the necessary authority to 
negotiate a direct bilateral linking agreement with the EU. In any event, even if 
                                                 
9 This was mentioned in all interviews. 
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California had the authority to do so, the lengthy negotiation and ratification 
process may not make a treaty the best option. 
Section III.A(ii) Mutual Amendment 
Establishing a direct bilateral link can also be achieved through reciprocal 
unilateral linking. This is achieved through adjusting the respective legislation 
underlying both schemes (Burtraw et al., 2013) and could be supplemented by a 
memorandum of understanding. This is how California and Quebec linked their 
ETSs. In doing so, neither party experienced any legal issues from their federal 
counterparts. Though this link was probably not seen to be an overly 
controversial step as both schemes were sub-national entities. 10  
 
Furthermore, as with an international treaty, the likelihood of the EU and 
California concluding a linking agreement will depend on the attitude of the US 
administration.11 
The California-Quebec agreement was negotiated under the Obama 
administration. Things could have been very different under a more 
conservative administration. Nevertheless, assuming legality is not an issue, 
mutual amendment would be the preferred means of linking the CAT and the 
EU ETS. It would drastically shorten the time for negotiations and the 
ratification process is rapidly shortened (Tuerk et al., 2009a). It would also give 
local regulators more control over the allowance price; for instance, by letting 
them establish quotas, exchange rates or apply fees (Burtraw et al., 2013).  
Section III.A(iii) Procedural Issues 
However, a link established purely by technical alterations may be perceived as 
illegitimate, particularly given the significant transfer of revenue that would 
flow across the two systems. As such, mutual amendment would need to be 
preceded by and/or involve a certain level of public debate, which would 
increase the transparency and scrutiny of the process (Tuerk et al., 2009a). This 
is already a requirement for California. Prior to linking with the Quebec ETS, the 
CARB underwent an extensive public consultation process (CARB, 2013b). 
Equally, before the Californian government can alter the CAT legislation, it is 
obligated to notify the public and receive their input concerning the linking 
                                                 
10 This was mentioned in one of the interviews. 
11 This was mentioned in several interviews. 
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amendment (Administrative Procedure Act 2008, s 11340 et seq). Furthermore, 
the Governor of California must be satisfied that (California Government Code, 
s 12894(f)):   
 
(1) The EU ETS is similar to or identical to the CAT in all material aspects; 
(2) Linking would not change California’s ability to enforce the CAT against 
entities in or outside of California; 
(3) The EU ETS laws and regulations allow for equivalent enforcement of the 
CAT; 
(4) Linking is unlikely to place significant liability on California. 
 
For the EU, the process to amend the EU ETS directive is laid out in the European 
Community Treaty (Art 175.1). Amendments would have to be initiated by a 
proposal from the EC to the European Parliament and Council. The matter 
would be taken to a vote, requiring a qualified majority. The transparency of the 
EU decision-making process, its openness to public submissions and the 
resultant media coverage would allow adequate time for comments from the 
public and key stakeholders.  
 
If the EU and California were to pursue linking by mutual amendment, a 
potential model for the memorandum and points for discussion could be the 
linking agreement signed by California and Quebec (Agreement, 2013). 
However, as California and Quebec worked together on the design of the WCI 
ETS model and had been cooperating and negotiating emissions trading for five 
years prior to the actual linking agreement. There may be other issues not 
mentioned in the linking agreement that would need to be addressed by the EU 
and California. 
Section III.A(iv) Negotiations  
Even if California has the legal leeway to conduct linking negotiations with the 
EU, how such negotiations will take place is uncertain.12 New EU MS, along with 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, essentially imported the EU ETS model 
without negotiating any design features. Although Norway sought to negotiate 
                                                 
12 This was raised in several interviews. 
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a link with the EU, the EC insisted that Norway simply import the EU ETS 
Directive (Hawkins & Jegou, 2014). However, the EU agreed to negotiate a link 
on equal terms with Australia. In light of this, how the EU will negotiate with 
California is unclear. Would California demand, and would the EC agree, to 
meet and negotiate on equal terms with a sub-national entity? It is also unclear 
how the MS would react to such treatment. This symbolically suggests that the 
EC would be willing to give California the same say over the final ETS design as 
all 28 MS combined.13 Although in reality, this is somewhat exaggerated as the 
final outcome of EU environmental agreements have mostly required both the 
approval of the EU and its MS (Mehling, 2007). As such, MS still have the final 
say over any linking agreement. 
 
Linking negotiations with California would be very different to the EU’s 
previous linking negotiations, in which ‘the other schemes had a significant 
interest in linking [with the EU ETS], which made them willing to accept the 
necessary compromises’ (Hawkins & Jegou, 2014, p.44). It is not clear that 
California would be willing to make such compromises. Thus, the EU may not be 
able to dictate terms and conditions to the extent it was able to do so in 
previous linking arrangements. 
Section III.A(v) Quebec & The WCI 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, an element not discussed is the 
question of linking with Quebec, and more broadly, the WCI. California and 
Quebec have already signed a linking agreement (Agreement, 2013), which 
means that most of their design features have already been harmonised for 
linking. Therefore, the final design of the linked EU-Californian scheme would 
also be compatible with the Quebec scheme. While it is not vital for Quebec to 
play a role in the negotiation of a linked EU-Californian ETS from a design 
perspective, politically, Quebec would surely want (and need) to play a role in 
the linking negotiations. Given all three parties would be present for any EU-
Californian linking negotiations, should a more formal link also be established 
with Quebec? 
 
                                                 
13 This was discussed in many interviews. 
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From a Californian perspective, having Quebec would help strengthen its 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the EU. However, it is debatable whether Quebec 
would even be in favour of linking with the EU, as the Quebec scheme is more 
ambitious than the EU ETS, reducing emissions 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 
(Sopher & Mansell, 2013b). Furthermore, the negative distributional impacts 
California would experience from an EU-Californian scheme would be felt even 
more in Quebec, as its ETS is significantly smaller than California’s (CARB, 2012). 
For the EU, including Quebec in linking discussions may make it harder to 
convince California about the merits of an EU-California linked scheme.  
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the EU would be interested in directly linking 
with Quebec. Although the EU was willing to directly link with Australia, it 
showed little interest in linking with the New Zealand ETS, even though 
Australia was also looking to link with New Zealand.14 Thus, for the EU, direct 
linking with key partners, supplemented by indirect links with other regional 
players may be sufficient. However, meeting with the WCI as a regional entity 
could help the EC sell the negotiated agreement to its MS, as the EC could frame 
the linking agreement as a compromise between two major regional ETSs. 
 
Ultimately, while a more detailed consideration of the intricacies of linking and 
negotiating an ETS between three players (or two regional systems) is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, it is important for European and Californian regulators 
to acknowledge the role of Quebec and the WCI when engaging in linking 
discussions.  
Section III.B Political feasibility 
Section III.B(i) Distributional Impact 
Linking the EU ETS and the CAT will lead to a more efficient outcome on the 
macro level. Emissions would be reduced at least cost, market liquidity would 
increase and firms would have more flexibility to achieve their target. Equally, 
the price convergence as a result of linking would decrease allowance prices in 
California, easing the burden on its firms and consumers. Furthermore, it offers 
California the opportunity to link with a major trading partner, as the EU is 
California’s second largest export market (California Chamber of Commerce, 
                                                 
14 This was raised in an interview. 
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2014). Linking could quell domestic competitiveness concerns that might arise 
absent such a link and could lead to further trading opportunities with the EU. 
From a European perspective, linking would also signal their commitment to 
climate change, strengthening their position in international climate change 
negotiations.  
 
However, linking may not necessarily lead to an equitable outcome on the 
micro level. As the allowance price increases in one system and decreases in the 
other, linking will create distributional issues (Haites & Mullins, 2001). As a 
result, there will be winners and losers on three levels: the linking partners, 
firms and consumers. This is particularly true in the linking of the EU ETS and 
the CAT. Even though both schemes have similar levels of ambition, the 
significant difference in the size of their carbon markets (Newell et al., 2014) 
means that EU conditions will have a greater impact on California. Given 
Californian allowances (US$11.48/tonne per Thomson Reuters, 2014) are 
currently more expensive than the EU’s (€7/tonne per Reed, 2014), linking will 
lead to a drop in Californian allowance prices. On the other hand, the EU could 
experience a slight increase in carbon prices, which may raise concerns about 
carbon leakage. Both the issue of capital flows between linked partners and 
carbon leakage are political issues, which must be addressed on both sides. 
 
Firstly, the linking partners would experience significant capital flows between 
both jurisdictions, which would have fiscal consequences, for California 
particularly, if it maintains its auction price floor without an exchange rate. In 
this scenario, if the EU’s allowance price falls below California’s auction price 
floor, Californian entities will purchase the cheaper EU allowances until prices 
equalise. This would result in a temporary, but potentially significant, loss of 
fiscal revenue for California (see figure 7). Although revenue raising is not the 
main purpose of the CAT, such funds do go into additional GHG emission 
reduction programmes and help compensate communities most vulnerable to 
climate change (Hsia-Kiung et al., 2014). Thus, the loss of such revenue would 
threaten the credibility of these programmes.  
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Similar concerns were also voiced with the planned Australian-EU link, with 
economists estimating AU$3-$5 billion loss in annual fiscal revenue (Priest & 
Drummond, 2012). In fact, Australia pre-emptively cut AU$2.4 billion from its 
climate programmes in anticipation of the lowered carbon price (Alexander, 
2013). Rather than axing its climate change programmes, California could 
choose to offset the decrease in revenue by making cuts in other sectors. 
However, this would only be an issue if California did not impose an exchange 
rate for EU ETS allowances once the price drops below its auction price floor (as 
discussed in section II.B(ii)), as this would safeguard its fiscal revenue. 
 
Figure 7: Anticipated CAT Allowance Revenues: 2012-2020 
 
Source: Sopher & Mansell, 2013a. 
 
Furthermore, if the EU ETS allowance price were to rise as a result of linking, it 
increases the risk of carbon leakage (Tuerk et al., 2009a). Carbon leakage occurs 
because an ETS imposes direct costs on the production process, as well as 
indirect costs, like higher electricity prices, which can affect intermediate inputs 
to production. These costs could prompt firms to relocate to countries with 
lower emission standards. This raises both economic and environmental 
concerns, as both the business and its emissions would be relocated outside of 
the carbon market (Newell et al., 2014). Even though carbon leakage and 
competitiveness concerns have been flagged by industries under the EU ETS, 
Laing and Mehling find ‘little evidence that these concerns are fully justified’ 
(2013, p.10). Furthermore, when looking across a spectrum of carbon markets, 
Newell et al. see little evidence of significant carbon leakage and declines in 
competitiveness (2014). The EU ETS has, if anything, experienced more 
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problems in over-compensating for such concerns (Laing & Mehling, 2013). 
However, if carbon leakage still remains a real concern for the EU, there are 
complementary policy measures, such as freely allocating allowances to 
exposed industries (Grubb & Neuhoff, 2006; Reinaud 2008; World Bank 2007), 
which could address such concerns. As the EU has already instigated some of 
these measures, maintaining them may make industries more amenable to 
linking 
 
Secondly, linking could be a positive development for both European and 
Californian firms as it gives them more flexibility to achieve emission 
reductions at least cost. Furthermore, a lowered carbon price also reduces 
allowance prices for Californian firms, decreasing their cost of compliance. 
Ultimately, although Ranson and Stavins offer a theoretical overview of which 
firms could benefit or suffer from linking (2014; see also section I.F(iii)), the 
exact impact on EU and Californian firms would depend on an analysis of the 
respective marginal abatement cost curves, as well as the extent to which firms 
can pass on the carbon price to their consumers. Unfortunately, this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
Thirdly, linking can have an impact on consumers (Burtraw et al., 2013).15 As 
Büchs et al. outline, an ETS will not only affect energy prices, but all other goods 
and services as well, due to the higher energy prices during production (2011). 
Indeed, the EU ETS has already seen increased electricity prices (Sijm et al., 
2005), and, as in many de-regulated electricity markets, the cost of the carbon 
price was passed on to the consumer. Given the broader coverage of the CAT, its 
carbon price could also affect Californian heating and gasoline prices (Mehling 
et al., 2011; Sterk, Mehling & Tuerk, 2009a). However, if the CAT were to link 
with the EU ETS, the resultant price convergence would lower the allowance 
price, which, in turn, would lessen the impact of the carbon price on consumers. 
Nevertheless, this is unlikely to be enough to persuade California to link with 
the EU ETS as it already has several mechanisms in place to deal with any rise in 
consumer prices.  
 
                                                 
15 For a more detailed examination of the distributional impacts of climate change policies see 
Büchs et al., 2011; Rausch, Metcalf & Reilly, 2011. 
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Firstly, California has tried to minimise any potential price spikes as a result of 
the CAT by giving sectors plenty of time to adjust. CARB has also attempted to 
apply some level of public pressure, stating that any sudden rises in fuel prices 
would ‘appear to be a deliberate measure on [the industry’s] part’ (Nichols in 
CSP Daily News, 2014). By shifting the public’s attention (and blame) towards 
industry, rather than the CAT, this could encourage firms to absorb some of the 
cost. Furthermore, California also requires electric utilities to sell their 
allowances at state auction to create a fund that ‘protects their ratepayers from 
costs of complying with cap-and-trade’ (Nichols, 2013).  
 
A lower carbon price is not necessarily an undesirable development for the CAT 
and the EU ETS, as it allows both schemes to achieve emission reductions at 
least costs. As the EU ETS is the larger market, linking with California will have 
less of an impact on its revenue, firms and consumers. Concerns about carbon 
leakage are also not significant, as the EU already has policies in place to 
address this. For California, linking with the EU would increase market liquidity 
and give its firms more flexibility to achieve its targets. A lowered carbon price 
would also reduce allowance prices for its firms and lessen the impact on 
consumers. Finally, concerns about Californian competitiveness would be partly 
alleviated, as it would be linking to a major trading partner. However, if 
California does not instigate an exchange rate, a lower carbon price could have 
negative consequences for its fiscal revenue. Thus, from a distributional 
perspective, California’s willingness to link is contingent on the imposition of an 
exchange rate. 
Section III.B(ii) Political Will 
 
Political Symbolism 
Even if all other conditions are conducive to linking, both parties must still have 
the political will to engage in a linked scheme. In the EU’s case, although it is 
currently focused on the structural reform of its own ETS, it still maintains the 
long-term goal of a transatlantic partnership (Tuerk, 2009). Although the US 
lacks a federal ETS, Europe’s bottom-up vision could still be realized through 
linking with regional ETSs operating in the US. In fact EU Climate Commissioner 
Hedegaard met with Californian representatives to discuss this very goal (Carus, 
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2011). This goal benefits the EU on the political front, as it shows a 
commitment to the EC’s more general aim of using the EU ETS as a means of 
achieving a bottom-up global network of ETSs (EC, 2013a). Furthermore, linking 
with the CAT also reaps political benefits on the international stage, as it 
signals the EU’s long-term commitment to climate change and multilateralism 
(Zetterberg, 2012), which could give its negotiators more weight and credibility 
during international climate change negotiations.  
 
From California’s standpoint, it might be argued that linking with the EU will 
increase the CAT’s political influence on US national climate policy (Burtraw et 
al., 2013),16 however, that may not be so persuasive, as California is already seen 
as a regional leader and holds a substantial level of influence over national 
environmental policy, as well as over the policies of other US States (Gero in 
Cart, 2011; Schmidt, 2007). Rather, California is focused on linking with other 
states in the WCI, having signed a linking agreement with Quebec at the end of 
last year. 17  The WCI States are also discussing linking with other regional 
schemes in North America (Mehling et al., 2011). As such, a transatlantic link 
does not seem to be a priority for California. 
 
Lowered Carbon Price & Potential EU ETS Reform 
As outlined in section III.B(i), if the CAT links with the EU ETS, the Californian 
allowance price will likely drop. Although linking would allow for the cost-
effective attainment of emission reductions in the short-term, Californian 
regulators may have other objectives that would necessitate a higher carbon 
price (Grosjean, Acworth, Flachsland & Marschinski, 2014). For instance, the 
Global Warming Solution Act (2006) and the WCI aim to stimulate low-carbon 
technology and innovation (Tuerk et al., 2009a). This is unlikely to happen with 
a lower carbon price. Furthermore, as evidenced by the price auction floor it is 
clear that California has its own notion of an acceptable carbon price (Jotzo & 
Betz, 2009). In fact, California has cited the EU ETS’ low allowance price as a 
reason for not pursuing further linking negotiations (Ranson & Stavins, 2014). A 
                                                 
16 This was also mentioned as a key goal of the CAT during the interviews. 
17  Even if both parties were not currently absorbed in other matters, negotiations would 
probably not lead to a harmonised agreement before 2020. A case in point is that of California 
and Quebec, whose schemes were established with the idea of forming a regional carbon 
market. Both parties cooperated for five years prior to linking, with another year spent on 
negotiating the actual agreement (Haug et al., 2014). 
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lower carbon price also risks the materialization of certain side benefits 
(Flachsland et al., 2009). However, such side benefits, like improvements in air 
quality and energy security are already addressed and regulated in California, 
for instance, through the Air Quality Improvement Program (2007) and the 
California Energy Security Coordination Act (2012). Thus, this is unlikely to be 
their primary concern. 
 
Apart from the effect linking would have on low-carbon innovation; another 
significant concern would be the impact on California’s domestic investment 
and abatement efforts. 18   The effect of a low carbon price on domestic 
abatement efforts was also one of the key concerns for Australia during linking 
negotiations with the EU ETS (Lynn & Lake, 2012). However, Australian 
policymakers were confident that the Commission reform proposals would 
remedy Europe’s low carbon price. Such an argument could also be made to 
Californian policymakers, however, much will depend on whether they perceive 
that such reforms will actually be implemented and are sufficient to raise the 
carbon price. As a short-term measure to deal with the low carbon price, the EU 
has proposed to fast-track a plan to backload 900 million allowances (EC, 
2014a; Reed, 2014). Although this will neither ensure a higher carbon price in 
the long-term nor address the supply-demand imbalance (Reed, 2014), it will 
serve as a temporary measure until the EU is able to introduce a MSR to prove a 
more long-term solution. If implemented, this could increase the price to 
€12.00/tonne (Hope, 2014). The EC’s 2030 draft framework on energy and 
climate policies, which outlines a 40% GHG emissions reduction target below 
1990 levels by 2030 (EC, 2013e), could also increase the allowance price and 
give investors greater certainty and confidence in the carbon market (Pinsent 
Masons, 2014).  
 
However, any reform to European climate policy is contingent on the 
willingness of its MS. As discussed in section II.B(ii), Poland, for one, is unwilling 
to act without a global climate change agreement (Krukowska, 2014), and 
although Poland alone cannot block EU ETS and broader climate reform, it is 
possible there may be other MS who share the same view (Tindale, 2012). Even 
                                                 
18 This point was mentioned during several interviews. 
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if such reforms pass, the success of the MSR is contingent on the EC getting the 
quantities right. More broadly, it is unclear whether the MSR is indeed the most 
effective means of reforming the EU ETS. If the drop in allowance prices 
triggered the whole debate on structural reform (Grosjean et al., 2014), this 
suggests price is the EU’s main concern. If the EU does want to impose some 
form of price control, doing so indirectly through the MSR may be an ineffective 
means of achieving this, necessitating further reforms in the future. 
 
Ultimately, if the EU is serious about linking with California, it should also 
consider two alternatives. Firstly, it may have to consider additional incentives, 
which outweigh the risks and negative consequences for California in a linked 
EU-Californian scheme. Secondly, given the divergent political preferences of 
both parties, direct bilateral linking may not be feasible. Indeed, there are many 
other forms of linking both parties could pursue. Therefore, as a second 
alternative, a more narrow form of linking could be implemented which, if 
designed correctly, could still deliver some of the cost-saving benefits of a direct 
bilateral link. Such examples include linking sector-based offsets or allowances. 
Additionally, this also allows both sides to maintain regulatory control and their 
design preferences. This may make an attractive starting point for both parties, 
with the possibility of expanding these narrow links, as political preferences 
change or as the respective programmes evolve (Burtraw et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 8: Political feasibility of linking the EU ETS and CAT  
Stakeholder 
Levels 
Pros and Cons: EU Pros and Cons: 
California 
1. Linked 
Market  
 
 Cost-effective attainment of emission reduction 
targets 
 Increased market liquidity and flexibility to 
achieve emission reduction targets 
 Undermine incentives for low-carbon innovation, 
domestic abatement and investment 
2. State  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strengthen 
position in 
international 
climate 
negotiations 
 Ambition of 
transatlantic 
carbon market  
 Link with major 
trading partner 
 Potential temporary 
loss of fiscal 
revenue** 
 Threaten 
programmes funded 
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 Slightly increased 
risk of carbon 
leakage 
with CAT revenue** 
 Minimal political 
symbolism: already 
seen as influential, 
regional leader  
3. Firm *  More abatement 
options 
 
 More abatement 
options   
 Cheaper allowance 
prices for firms 
 
4. Consumer   Minimal impact   Lower carbon price 
* = Contingent on firms’ marginal abatement cost and ability to pass on carbon 
price to consumers. 
** = If California does not impose an exchange rate. 
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Section IV Conclusion  
The analysis conducted in this thesis shows that the feasibility of linking the EU 
ETS and the CAT is not high. From a technical perspective, the four design 
features analysed highlight two major obstacles. First and foremost is the issue 
of California’s auction price floor. If linked, this feature would be automatically 
propagated into the EU ETS. However, even though California could attempt to 
solve this dilemma by imposing an exchange rate on the price of EU ETS 
allowances, divergent notions of an acceptable carbon price will likely remain 
an obstacle to linking. Secondly, the EU does not include LULUCF offsets into its 
own ETS, however California does. Although the EU was open to linking with 
Australia, whose ETS included domestic LULUCF offsets, whether the EU will do 
so for California is contingent on the compromises reached over other design 
features. 
 
From a legal perspective, it is unclear whether California, as a sub-national 
state, has the authority to negotiate and link with the EU. Much will depend on 
the consent of the US administration. With regards to political feasibility, 
California is unlikely to be in favour of linking with the EU, as this would lower 
its carbon price. This not only affects its fiscal revenue but other policy goals, 
like low-carbon innovation and domestic investment, may also be 
compromised. One way of addressing California’s concerns is through structural 
reform of the EU ETS. However, this depends on whether such EU ETS reforms 
substantially lift the carbon price.  
 
This thesis has shown that in theory, linking ETSs can deliver significant cost-
efficiency gains for both parties. However, the case of California and the EU 
shows that, in practice, the political preferences and design choices of the 
linking partners are more important. This thesis has also shown that the 
distributional consequences can affect the decision to link. In the case of 
California, even if some compromise on price floors and LULUCF offsets can be 
found, it is still unlikely to link with the EU, given the potential negative impacts 
it would have on a domestic level. If the EU ETS is interested in linking in the 
future, it cannot assume other parties would be equally willing. As such, the EU 
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may need to offer additional incentives or consider incomplete linkages, which 
can deliver some of the benefits of direct linking, whilst also maintaining 
political preferences and regulatory control. Such linkages might include 
unilateral links, or sector-based offset and allowance links. By doing so, this 
could provide a good starting point for California and the EU, with the potential 
for further expansion as political preferences and their respective ETSs evolve. 
Section IV.A Further Research 
This thesis has outlined some obstacles to linking the EU ETS with the CAT. 
However, it has also identified three areas for further research. Firstly, although 
a quantity-based mechanism could be aligned with a price-based mechanism, it 
is unclear how this would work in practice. Secondly, as California is linked to 
Quebec, and is part of the WCI, the challenges of linking the EU ETS with 
multiple sub-national schemes and/or another regional scheme must also be 
considered. Given the prevalence of regional ETSs, like the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative and China’s sub-national ETSs, this question is of particular 
relevance when considering the future direction of linking. Finally, it has also 
highlighted the importance of political preferences and the domestic impact of 
linking. Although additional incentives and incomplete linkages have been 
suggested as alternatives to facilitate linking, the exact nature of such 
incentives and links are unclear. Therefore, further research is recommended.  
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Annex A: List of existing and planned ETSs 
Source: Haug et al., 2014 
1. EU (+Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland) (in force, linking discussions 
with Switzerland underway) 
2. Switzerland (in force, linking discussions with EU underway) 
3. Kazakhstan (in force) 
4. Russia (under consideration) 
5. Turkey (under consideration) 
6. Ukraine (under consideration) 
7. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (in force) 
8. Western Climate Initiative  
a. California (in force, linked to Quebec) 
b. Quebec (in force, linked to California) 
c. British Colombia (under consideration) 
d. Manitoba (under consideration) 
e. Ontario (under consideration) 
9. Brazil (under consideration) 
a. Rio de Janeiro (under consideration) 
b. Sao Paolo (under consideration) 
10. Chile (under consideration) 
11. Mexico (under consideration) 
12. Tokyo (in force) 
13. Republic of Korea (scheduled) 
14. China (in force) 
a. Beijing (in force) 
b. Guangdong (in force) 
c. Shanghai (in force) 
d. Shenzhen (in force) 
e. Tianjin (in force) 
f. Chongqing (scheduled) 
g. Hubei (scheduled) 
h. Hangzhou (under consideration) 
15. Japan (under consideration) 
16. Thailand (under consideration) 
17. Australia (in force, likely dismantled) 
18. New Zealand (in force) 
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Annex B: Climate and Energy policies in the EU and California  
 
EU California19 
Transport: 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard: 
 Reduce GHG intensity of fuels 
used in vehicles by up to 10% 
by 2020 
 Biofuel sustainability targets 
for transport fuels and also 
takes into account indirect land 
use 
2009: Mandatory introduction of 
sulfur-free fuels to increase air quality 
 
 
Transport: 
GHG emission standards for passenger 
vehicles (Assembly Bill 1493, 2002): 
 Reduce new car emissions by 30% 
as of 2016 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard (California Code 
of Regulations, Art 4(7), s 95480):  
 Performance standards for fuel 
producers and importers as of 2011. 
10% carbon intensity reduction of the full 
life cycle of transport fuels by 2020 
(Executive Order S-1-07, 2007). 
Alternative and Renewable Fuel and 
Technology Programme  
 Public funding to clean fuel/vehicle 
projects 
Renewables: 
 20% use of renewables in 
energy consumption by 2020 
(27% by 2030)  
 20% increase in energy 
efficiency 
Renewables: 
Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard: 
 Requires utilities to use 33% 
renewable energy by 2020. 
Sustainability 
EU Sustainable Development Strategy 
(2006) 
 EU sustainable development 
integration strategy for: 
industry, aquaculture, 
economic policy, transport, 
global poverty & external 
relations 
 Green public procurement 
Sustainability 
 Requires each region to have a 
sustainable commitment strategy 
that focuses on transport, land use 
and housing to meet GHG 
reduction targets set by the CARB. 
Source: Haug et al., 2014; Hsia-Kiung et al., 2014; CARB, 2011; EC, 2008; EC, 2014c; 
California Public Utilities Commission, 2013. 
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19 For a more comprehensive list of California’s climate policies, see Brewer, 2011. 
